Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
Santa Fe Institute · University of California, Los Angeles · +3 more institutions
Abstract
Because mutually beneficial cooperation may unravel unless most members of a group contribute, people often gang up on free-riders, punishing them when this is cost-effective in sustaining cooperation. In contrast, current models of the evolution of cooperation assume that punishment is uncoordinated and unconditional. These models have difficulty explaining the evolutionary emergence of punishment because rare unconditional punishers bear substantial costs and hence are eliminated. Moreover, in human behavioral experiments in which punishment is uncoordinated, the sum of costs to punishers and their targets often exceeds the benefits of the increased cooperation that results from the punishment of…
Citation impact
- FWCI
- 154.37
- Percentile
- 100%
- References
- 32
Authors
3Topics & keywords
- Punishment (psychology)
- Free rider problem
- Microeconomics
- Economics
- Law and economics
- Public good
- Social psychology
- Psychology