When Does "Economic Man" Dominate Social Behavior?
California Institute of Technology · University of Zurich · +1 more institution
Abstract
The canonical model in economics considers people to be rational and self-regarding. However, much evidence challenges this view, raising the question of when "Economic Man" dominates the outcome of social interactions, and when bounded rationality or other-regarding preferences dominate. Here we show that strategic incentives are the key to answering this question. A minority of self-regarding individuals can trigger a "noncooperative" aggregate outcome if their behavior generates incentives for the majority of other-regarding individuals to mimic the minority's behavior. Likewise, a minority of other-regarding individuals can generate a "cooperative" aggregate outcome if their behavior generates incentives…
Citation impact
- FWCI
- 104.53
- Percentile
- 100%
- References
- 48
Authors
2Topics & keywords
- Outcome (game theory)
- Bounded rationality
- Incentive
- Economics
- Microeconomics
- Aggregate (composite)
- Rationality
- Nash equilibrium