Financing the Newsvendor: Supplier vs. Bank, and the Structure of Optimal Trade Credit Contracts
Washington University in St. Louis · Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Abstract
We consider a supply chain with a retailer and a supplier: A newsvendor-like retailer has a single opportunity to order a product from a supplier to satisfy future uncertain demand. Both the retailer and supplier are capital constrained and in need of short-term financing. In the presence of bankruptcy risks for both the retailer and supplier, we model their strategic interaction as a Stackelberg game with the supplier as the leader. We use the supplier early payment discount scheme as a decision framework to analyze all decisions involved in optimally structuring the trade credit contract (discounted wholesale price if paying early, financing rate if delaying payment) from the supplier's perspective. Under…
Citation impact
- FWCI
- 38.92
- Percentile
- 100%
- References
- 30
Authors
2Topics & keywords
- Trade credit
- Newsvendor model
- Stackelberg competition
- Business
- Payment
- Supply chain
- Order (exchange)
- Economic order quantity