articleOperations ResearchJun 1, 2012Closed access

Financing the Newsvendor: Supplier vs. Bank, and the Structure of Optimal Trade Credit Contracts

Washington University in St. Louis · Shanghai Jiao Tong University

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Abstract

We consider a supply chain with a retailer and a supplier: A newsvendor-like retailer has a single opportunity to order a product from a supplier to satisfy future uncertain demand. Both the retailer and supplier are capital constrained and in need of short-term financing. In the presence of bankruptcy risks for both the retailer and supplier, we model their strategic interaction as a Stackelberg game with the supplier as the leader. We use the supplier early payment discount scheme as a decision framework to analyze all decisions involved in optimally structuring the trade credit contract (discounted wholesale price if paying early, financing rate if delaying payment) from the supplier's perspective. Under…

Citation impact

751
total citations
FWCI
38.92
Percentile
100%
References
30
Citations per year

Authors

2

Topics & keywords

Keywords
  • Trade credit
  • Newsvendor model
  • Stackelberg competition
  • Business
  • Payment
  • Supply chain
  • Order (exchange)
  • Economic order quantity
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