articleComparative Political StudiesJan 31, 2008Closed access

Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule

Stanford University

Indexed incrossref

Abstract

To survive in office, dictators need to establish power-sharing arrangements with their ruling coalitions, which are often not credible. If dictators cannot commit to not abusing their “loyal friends”—those who choose to invest in the existing autocratic institutions rather than in forming subversive coalitions— they will be in permanent danger of being overthrown, both by members of the ruling elite and by outside rivals. This article explores the role of autocratic political parties and elections (both one-party and multiparty) in mitigating the commitment problem, making power-sharing between the dictator and his ruling coalition possible.

Citation impact

1,121
total citations
FWCI
71.30
Percentile
100%
References
35
Citations per year

Authors

1

Topics & keywords

Keywords
  • Autocracy
  • Dictator
  • Elite
  • Authoritarianism
  • Commit
  • Power (physics)
  • Power sharing
  • Politics
UN Sustainable Development Goals
  • Peace, Justice and strong institutions
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