articleJun 13, 2004Closed access
The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
University of California, Berkeley · Berkeley College
Indexed incrossref
Abstract
We investigate from the computational viewpoint multi-player games that are guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria. We focus on congestion games, and show that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time in the symmetric network case, while the problem is PLS-complete in general. We discuss implications to non-atomic congestion games, and we explore the scope of the potential function method for proving existence of pure Nash equilibria.
Citation impact
661
total citations
- FWCI
- 53.62
- Percentile
- 100%
- References
- 26
Citations per year
Authors
3Topics & keywords
Topics
Keywords
- Nash equilibrium
- Best response
- Epsilon-equilibrium
- Mathematical economics
- Focus (optics)
- Scope (computer science)
- Computer science
- Risk dominance
No related works found for this paper.