articleJun 13, 2004Closed access

The complexity of pure Nash equilibria

University of California, Berkeley · Berkeley College

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Abstract

We investigate from the computational viewpoint multi-player games that are guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria. We focus on congestion games, and show that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time in the symmetric network case, while the problem is PLS-complete in general. We discuss implications to non-atomic congestion games, and we explore the scope of the potential function method for proving existence of pure Nash equilibria.

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661
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Authors

3

Topics & keywords

Keywords
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Best response
  • Epsilon-equilibrium
  • Mathematical economics
  • Focus (optics)
  • Scope (computer science)
  • Computer science
  • Risk dominance
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