Conflicts Of Interest And The Case Of Auditor Independence: Moral Seduction And Strategic Issue Cycling
Carnegie Mellon University · University of California, Berkeley · +1 more institution
Abstract
A series of financial scandals revealed a key weakness in the American business model: the failure of the U.S. auditing system to deliver true independence. We offer a two-tiered analysis of what went wrong. At the more micro tier, we advance moral seduction theory, explaining why professionals are often unaware of how morally compromised they have become by conflicts of interest. At the more macro tier, we offer issue-cycle theory, explaining why conflicts of interest of the sort that compromise major accounting firms are so pervasive.
Citation impact
- FWCI
- 55.82
- Percentile
- 100%
- References
- 128
Authors
4- DADon A. MooreCorresponding
Carnegie Mellon University, University of California, Berkeley
- PEPhilip E. Tetlock
Carnegie Mellon University, University of California, Berkeley
- LTLloyd Tanlu
Harvard University Press, Carnegie Mellon University, University of California, Berkeley
- MHMax H. Bazerman
Harvard University Press, Carnegie Mellon University, University of California, Berkeley
Topics & keywords
- Compromise
- Auditor independence
- Audit
- Independence (probability theory)
- Conflict of interest
- sort
- Emptiness
- Self-interest
- Peace, Justice and strong institutions