articleThe Quarterly Journal of EconomicsMay 1, 2011Closed access

Fear of Fire Sales, Illiquidity Seeking, and Credit Freezes *

University of Chicago

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Abstract

Is there any need to “clean ” up a banking system in the midst of a crisis, for instance, by closing some weak banks and forcing others to sell bad assets, or can one wait till the crisis is over? We argue that an “overhang ” of impaired banks that may be forced to sell assets in the future can increase the private returns to holding illiquid assets sufficiently that weak banks have no interest in selling them. Anticipating a potential future fire sale, cash rich buyers have high expected returns to holding cash, which also reduces their incentive to lock up money in term loans. The potential for a worse fire sale than necessary, as well as the associated decline in credit origination, could make the crisis…

Citation impact

595
total citations
FWCI
60.25
Percentile
100%
References
44
Citations per year

Authors

2

Topics & keywords

Keywords
  • Incentive
  • Closing (real estate)
  • Business
  • Forcing (mathematics)
  • Finance
  • Economics
  • Monetary economics
  • Microeconomics
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