The evolution of altruistic punishment
Santa Fe Institute · University of California, Los Angeles · +2 more institutions
Abstract
Both laboratory and field data suggest that people punish noncooperators even in one-shot interactions. Although such "altruistic punishment" may explain the high levels of cooperation in human societies, it creates an evolutionary puzzle: existing models suggest that altruistic cooperation among nonrelatives is evolutionarily stable only in small groups. Thus, applying such models to the evolution of altruistic punishment leads to the prediction that people will not incur costs to punish others to provide benefits to large groups of nonrelatives. However, here we show that an important asymmetry between altruistic cooperation and altruistic punishment allows altruistic punishment to evolve in populations…
Citation impact
- FWCI
- 175.09
- Percentile
- 100%
- References
- 41
Authors
4- RBRobert BoydCorresponding
Santa Fe Institute, University of California, Los Angeles, University of Massachusetts Amherst, University of California, Davis
- HGHerbert Gintis
Santa Fe Institute, University of California, Los Angeles, University of Massachusetts Amherst, University of California, Davis
- SBSamuel Bowles
Santa Fe Institute, University of California, Los Angeles, University of Massachusetts Amherst, University of California, Davis
- PJPeter J. Richerson
Santa Fe Institute, University of California, Los Angeles, University of Massachusetts Amherst, University of California, Davis
Topics & keywords
- Punishment (psychology)
- Altruism (biology)
- Social psychology
- Strong reciprocity
- Psychology
- Microeconomics
- Economics
- Game theory
- Peace, Justice and strong institutions