Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete Experiment
Harvard University · University of North Carolina at Charlotte
Abstract
Whereas a number of studies have considered the implications of employee mobility, comparatively little research has considered institutional factors governing the ability of employees to move from one firm to another. This paper explores a legal constraint on mobility—employee non-compete agreements—by exploiting Michigan's apparently inadvertent 1985 reversal of its non-compete enforcement policy as a natural experiment. Using a differences-in-differences approach, and controlling for changes in the auto industry central to Michigan's economy, we find that the enforcement of non-competes indeed attenuates mobility. Moreover, non-compete enforcement decreases mobility more sharply for inventors with…
Citation impact
- FWCI
- 91.85
- Percentile
- 100%
- References
- 86
Authors
3Topics & keywords
- Enforcement
- Constraint (computer-aided design)
- Industrial organization
- Business
- Natural experiment
- Labor mobility
- Labour economics
- Economics