articleJournal of Political EconomyFeb 1, 2004Closed access

Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market

National Bureau of Economic Research · Harvard University · +1 more institution

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Abstract

We use a unique data set of annuities in the United Kingdom to test for adverse selection. We find systematic relationships between ex post mortality and annuity characteristics, such as the timing of payments and the possibility of payments to the annuitant's estate. These patterns are consistent with the presence of asymmetric information. However, we find no evidence of substantive mortality differences by annuity size. These results suggest that the absence of selection on one contract dimension does not preclude its presence on others. This highlights the importance of considering detailed features of insurance contracts when testing theoretical models of asymmetric information.

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665
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Authors

2

Topics & keywords

Keywords
  • Adverse selection
  • Annuity
  • Actuarial science
  • Payment
  • Economics
  • Information asymmetry
  • Estate
  • Selection (genetic algorithm)
UN Sustainable Development Goals
  • Good health and well-being
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