Effects of stochastic games on evolutionary dynamics in structured populations
Southwest University · Kyung Hee University · +4 more institutions
Abstract
Continuously changing environments have a paramount role in the evolution of cooperative behavior. Previous works have shown that the transitions among different games, as the feedback between behaviors and environments, can promote cooperative behavior significantly. Quantitative analysis, however, is limited to homogeneous populations, while realistic populations in nature are often more complex and highly heterogeneous. We hereby provide an analytical treatment of when the evolution of cooperation can be supported in stochastic games, applying to arbitrary spatial heterogeneity and payoff structure. We highlight that the rule and frequency of game changes can have surprisingly diverse effects on…
Citation impact
- FWCI
- 187.24
- Percentile
- 100%
- References
- 65
Authors
5Topics & keywords
- Stochastic game
- Evolutionary dynamics
- Public goods game
- Evolutionary game theory
- Public good
- Population
- Homogeneous
- Stochastic dynamics
Funding
- NNNational Natural Science Foundation of ChinaAward: No. 62206230
- NSNatural Science Foundation of ChongqingAwards: CSTB2023NSCQ, CSTB2023NSCQ-MSX0064
- NKNemzeti Kutatási Fejlesztési és Innovációs HivatalAward: K142948
- CSCentre Scientifique et Technique du Bâtiment
- NRNational Research, Development and Innovation OfficeAward: K142948