Dynamic Event-Triggered Control for Human–Machine Cooperative Systems Based on Dynamic Authority Allocation

This article addresses the challenging problem of constrained optimal control for human–machine systems subject to external disturbances and the bounded rationality of the human operator. To this end, a novel game-theoretic framework is proposed. Unlike monolithic game formulations, the framework uniquely disaggregates the control problem by transforming it into a multifaceted game via logarithmic barrier functions (BFs): it models human–machine cooperation as a positive-sum game oriented toward shared objectives, and disturbance rejection as a zero-sum game tailored for robustness enhancement. To capture the nonideal human decision-making, we integrate the level- $k$ reasoning framework to model the…

• NS
  Natural Science Foundation of Henan Province

  Award: 252300421862
• SA
  Science and Technology Department of Henan Province

  Award: 252102241065